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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsCase No.

14028

MIDWEST REALTY AND FINANCE,
INC., a Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
oooOooo
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
oooOooo-—
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein the plaintiff-respondent
seeks to recover for loans made to Lee Chair Corporation on the
basis of a guarantee of such indebtedness by defendant-appellants.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower Court granted judgment in favor of plaintiffrespondents and against defendant-apellants for the total indebtedness of Lee Chair Corporation.
THE NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellants seek reversal of the judgment
in total, or in the alternative, reversal of the judgment pertaining to one line of credit extended to Lee Chair Corporation.
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-2STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to November 4, 1970, defendant-appellant
(hereinafter referred to as "Midwest") was negotiating for a
merger and consolidation wherein Lee Chair Corporation would be
merged into Midwest International, Inc., and the surviving
corporation would then be merged into Midwest (Tr. 10). It
was determined that in order to keep Lee Chair Corporation
viable during the negotiation period, it was necessary to
procure financial assistance for Lee Chair Corporation (Tr. 11).
Inasmuch as the financial status of Lee Chair
Corporation was such that it was unable to obtain credit,
Midwest contacted plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to
as "Bank") for the purpose of inducing an extension of credit
to Lee Chair Corporation (Tr. 11).
Inasmuch as the Bank was unwilling to extend the
credit to Lee Chair Corporation on the basis of its credit
standing alone, (Tr. 11) Midwest executed and delivered to the
Bank a "continuing guarantee" (Exhibit 3).

The "continuining

guarantee" was executed and delivered to the Bank on or about
November 4, 1970.

The execution and delivery of this guarantee

was made by Midwest pursuant to the written authorization of
its Board of Directors (Exhibit 4).

The guarantee will here-

inafter be referred to as the "November Guarantee."
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-3On the day following the execution and delivery of
the guarantee, the Bank advanced to Lee Chair Corporation the
sum of Sixty Thousand ($60,000.00) Dollars (Tr. 34). This loan
was evidenced by a note bearing the date November 5, 1970
(Tr. 34). The note was renewed on February 11, 1971; May 18,
«

1971; August 4, 1971; September 22, 1971 and on February 4,
1972 after the payment of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars
principal (Tr. 34, Exhibit 16).

Each renewal was accompanied

by the payment of interest accruing to the date of the renewal
(Exhibit 16).

The last promissory note, dated February 4, 1972,

is before the Court as Exhibit 2. With respect to this particular line of credit, each note was a renewal of pre-existing
indebtedness; there was no new money advanced to Lee Chair
Corporation.
As merger negotiations continued, it was decided that
in addition to the unsecured credit or Sixty Thousand ($60,000.00)
Dollars, Lee Chair needed further financial assistance (Tr. 11).
Application was made to the Bank to extend an additional line of
credit secured by Lee Chair's accounts receivable (Exhibit 9).
In order to induce the Bank to extend this additional credit,
Midwest, on December 17, 1970, executed and delivered to the
Bank another "continuing guarantee" (Exhibit 11).

The execution

and delivery of this guarantee was authorized by a resolution
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-4of the Board of Directors of Midwest on December 17, 1970#
(Exhibit 12).

This guarantee will hereinafter be referred to

as the "December Guarantee."
In reliance upon the December Guarantee, the Bank
extended to Lee Chair Corporation an open ended credit line
secured by the Lee Chairfs accounts receivable (Exhibit 9).
Credit extensions were granted as needed and payments on the
accounts receivable were applied against the indebtedness.
The extensions of credit and payments are itemized on Exhibit
10.
Negotiations for the merger apparently broke down
and Midwest was faced with the problem of minimizing their
loss under the guarantees. Midwest was faced with two alternatives:

(a) terminate the guarantee thereby cutting off any

future advances to Lee Chair; (b) place a ceiling on the
guarantee at the level of the outstanding indebtedness thereby
preventing the balance of the account from exceeding the
amount of indebtedness which Midwest was already liable for.
The first alternative had the danger of cutting off all funds
and thereby forcing Lee Chair to discontinue business.

This

would sacrifice any chance of Lee Chair paying its own debt
from current income.

The second alternative had the advantages

of freezing the loss at its present level, and still allowing
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-5funds to go into the business in the hope of reducing the
debt with current income*
Midwest wisely chose the second alternative.

In a

letter dated July 6, 1971, to the Bank wherein they noted:
"It is our desire that the guarantee be
immediately reduced to the amount of the outstanding obligations covered by the Lee Chair
note. We believe this to be about $85f000.00."
The letter in no way indicated a desire to terminate
the guarantee or cut off future advances on the accounts
receivable financing.

In fact, thd content of the letter

was precisely the opposite.

All mention of cancellation was in

the context of the future, and the letter specifically stated
this was not to be a final cancellation:
"It was the decision of the Board that we
will withdraw the 'continuing guarantee1 of
Midwest Realty and Finance, Inc., for and on
behalf of Lee Chair Corporation. This guarantee
is dated December 17, 1970, and is in the amount
of $130,000.00. . . . W e would appreciate your
earliest reply, indicating any further requirements
for finalizing this cancellation." (Emphasis added)
The decision to "cap" the guarantee rather than cancel
the guarantee and cut off further funds turned out to be an
advantageous decision for Midwest.

At the time of the receipt

of the July 6, 1971 letter (which was on July 8, 1971) the
outstanding indebtedness on the accounts receivable credit line
was Thirty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Two Dollars and
i
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-697/100 cents ($32,672.97) (Exhibit 10).

By capping the account,

and allowing current income to reduce the indebtedness, the
indebtedness was reduced by Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred
Ninety-Eight Dollars and 71/100 cents ($23,798.71) (Exhibit 10)
down to Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Four Dollars and
26/100 cents ($8,874.26).
The letter of July 6, 1971, by its specific terms,
applied only to the December Guarantee.
of the November Guarantee.
one guarantee is obvious:

There was no mention

The reason for designating only
the indebtedness under the November

Guarantee was already equal to the maximum limit of that guarantee
and therefore no reason to "cap" the same.

However, the

December Guarantee permitted a limit of One Hundred Thirty
Thousand ($130,000.00) Dollars and therefore was the only
available means of reducing Midwest's exposure.
On July 8, 1971, Mr. John G. Wells of Midwest
telephoned the Bank and spoke with its Vice-President, Mr.
Winrow.

At that time the parties confirmed the agreement to

cap the accounts receivable credit line at its existing balance
(Exhibit 8).

The substance of the telephone conversation was

summarized in a letter from the Bank to Midwest which stated:
"As to your letter of July 6, 1971, we
have discussed this with Mr. Winrow and he stated
that according to his conversation with Mr.
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-7Wells, the intent of the letter was to "cap"
the borrowing which was done." (Exhibit 8).
Prior to this lawsuit, Midwest never contested the
summarization of the telephone conversation as stated in the
letter (Tr. 21).
After receipt by the Bank of the letter of July 6,
1971, (on July 8, 1971) the indebtedness of the accounts
receivable credit line never exceeded the balance existing on that
date (Exhibit 10).

In factf the balance of the accounts recei-

vable credit line declined continuously from July 8, 1971, until
the date of suit when it was reduced to its present balance of
Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Four Dollars and 26/100
cents ($8#874.26).

The decision to "cap" the account rather

than to cancel the guarantee permitted Lee Chair to remain in
business and reduce the accounts receivable credit line substantially.
Inasmuch as the November Guarantee was never revoked/
capped or otherwise amended all renewals of that indebtedness
were pursuant to the specific terms of the guarantee which
permitted the Bank to "renew; extend, accelerate or otherwise
change the time of payment of, or otherwise change the terms
of the indebtedness or any part thereof, including increase
or decrease in the rate of interest thereon. . ." (Exhibit 3)
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-8The December Guarantee was amended only with respect to the upper
limits so that the unamended terms of that guarantee specifically
permitted the Bank to extend, renew and advance credit so long
as the amended upper limit was not exceeded (Exhibit 11).
As time passed Lee Chair was unable to respond to
its obligations under the credit arrangements and the collateral/ consisting of Leefs accounts receivablef was exhausted.
The Bank made demand upon Midwest to respond pursuant to the
terms of its guarantees.

Midwest refused claiming that its

letter of July 6, 1971, constituted a cancellation of both
guarantees and it was not responsible for any extension of
credit or renewal of credit occurring after receipt of said
letter.

Pursuant to this refusal to respond to the obligation

stated in the guarantees, Midwest commenced this suit.
At the trial, tY\e Court found that the letter of
July 6, 1971, was not a cancellation of either guarantee and
had the sole effect amending the upper limit of the December
guarantee and that the Bank abided by the terms of the amended
guarantee (R. 110-111).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LETTER OF JULY 6, 1971 DID NOT CANCEL OR
REVOKE THE GUARANTEE OF MIDWEST
The sole issue before the trial court was the intent
behind the execution and delivery of the letter of July 6,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-91971.

Counsel for Midwest admitted during the course of the

trial that the only disputed issue,was the meaning of the
July 6, 1971 letter (Tr. 16), quoted on pp. 20-21, infra).
All other issues are dependent on the disposition of this
primary issue.

In fact, all issues raised by Midwest in its

Brief are rendered moot by a determination that the letter did
not constitute a cancellation or revocation of the guarantees.
The trial court, after a consideration of all of the
facts presented at trial, determined:
"The intent of Midwest as expressed in
the letter of July 6, 1971, was to reduce the
upper limit set forth in the continuing guarantee
of December 17, 1970 (Exhibit 11) and establish
a new upper limit of said guarantee in an amount
equal to the outstanding indebtedness of Lee
Chair Corporation to Wells Fargo Bank as of July 8,
1971. It was not the intent of the letter to
revoke the guarantee of December 17, 1970, or to
cancel said guarantee but only to establish a new
upper limit to the guarantee. Aside from lowering
the upper limit of the guarantee, Midwest did not
intend to have any other effect or modification of
the guarantee of December 17, 1970." (R.110).
The objective of the Brief filed by Midwest is to
argue the facts of the case in an attempt to have a re-trial
of the case in this Court.

Midwest asks this Court to review

the facts, resolve disputed facts, and draw inferences from
the facts different than those drawn by the trial court.
Midwest's argument completely ignores the established law
announced many times by this Court that decisions by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10trier of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if there is any
evidence to support them.

This Court has held that it will not

overrule the trier of fact "unless the evidence so unerringly
pointed to a contrary conclusion that there existed no reasonable
basis for the finding."

Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Company,

5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622 (1956).

Accord, Aagard v. Dayton

and Miller Red-E Mix Concrete Company, 12 Utah 2d 34, 361 P.2d
522 (1961).

The findings of a trial court will be reversed

only if the finding "did such violence to common sense as to
convince the Court that no fact trier, acting fairly and reasonably, would refuse to make such a finding. . ."

Ray v. Consoli-

dated Freight Ways, 4 Utah 2d 137, 289 P.2d 196, 201 (1955).
Accord, Wood v. Taylor, 8 Utah 2d 210, 332 P.2d 215 (1958).
So long as there is evidence to support a factual determination,
this Court will not reverse such determination even though
this Court may disagree as to the factual decision.

Brigham v.

Moon Lake Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393
(1970).

The policy of upholding all reasonable factual findings

of the trial court is based in part upon its advantaged position
in factual matters, Peterson v. Holloway, 8 Utah 2d 328, 334
P.2d 559 (1959); Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981
(1958).
With respect to the issues involved in the instant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-11case, this Court has held that where the parties to a transaction dispute the intent surrounding some act involved in
the transaction, the question of the intent is a factual
issue and the determination of that factual issue will not
be disturbed on appeal if there is any evidence to support it.
Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972); Garrett
Freight lines v. Cornwall, 120 Utah 175, 232 P.2d 786 (1951);
Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Construction Company, 22 Utah 2d 207,
450 P.2d 985 (1969).
Midwest fails to understand that the question presented
is not what the trial court could have reasonably found from
the evidence.

The question is, "are the findings that were

actually made by the trial court supported by any evidence?"
General Insurance Company v. Lewis, 121 Utah 440, 243 P.2d 433
(1952).
The apparent justification for arguing the facts of
the case in the Appellate Court is the claim, unsupported by
the citation of any case or authority, that this is an equity
case and that the Appellate Court may therefore independently
determine the disputed factual issues.

Although Midwest cites

several cases noting the standard to be applied in equity cases,
there is not a single authority supporting the notion that this
is an equity case*
This is not an equity case, there are no grounds for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-12equitable relief.

This Court has held:

"If there is a legal remedy available to
which resort may be had without any substantial
or irreparable damage, one may not seek equity.
Erisman v. Overman, 11 Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85,
88 (1961)."
The guarantees which are the subject matter of this case are
common contracts used extensively in the commercial world.
Power-line Company v. Russell's Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135 P. 2d
906, 911 (1943).

The Complaint in this action alleges a

breach of said contract and seeks the legal remedy of money
damages.

All defenses asserted by Midwest are legal defenses.

The equitable defenses of waiver and estoppel were waived by
stipulation at the trial, Tr. 16.

The remedies and defenses

being legal in their nature, and said remedies and defenses
being sufficient, there is no basis for the application of
equitable principles.
Even if there were an equity case, the evidence,
summarized below, justifies the finding that the letter of
July 6, 1971 was not a cancellation or revocation of the
guarantees.

The findings of the trial court would be

upheld even under an equitable standard.

The principles of

equity state that findings of fact "will not be disturbed unless
the evidence clearly preponderates against them and a manifest
injustice or inequity is wrought."

McCullough v. Wasserback,

30 Utah 2d 398, 518 P.2d 691 (1974).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-13Inasmuch as the Court is concerned only with the
question of whether there is evidence upon which the trial
court could find that the July letter did not cancel the
guarantee, the Bank will confine its argument to noting the
evidence in support of the finding.

The Bank will not attempt

a complete response to Midwest's factual arguments wherein it
cites evidence contrary to the Court's finding because consideration of such evidence is irrelevant if the finding is supported
by any evidence.

See authorities cited above.

The evidence in support of the Court's finding that
the July letter did not constitute a cancellation or revocation
of the guarantees is overwhelming.
The July letter clearly unequivocally stated:
"It is our desire that the guarantee be
immediately reduced to the amount of the outstanding
obligations covered by the L.E.E. Chair note. We
believe this to be about $85,000.00."
There is simply no other way to interpret the above
language than to conclude that Midwest wished a ceiling on the
account so as to limit their exposure under the guarantee.
The most convincing evidence that a cancellation was
not intended, is the wording in the letter which refers to
revocation or cancellation.

Both references clearly established

that Midwest contemplated cancellation or revocation in the
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-14future, and did not intend a revocation or cancellation at the
present time:
"It was the decision of the Board that we will
withdraw the 'continuing guarantee1 of Midwest
Realty & Finance, Inc., for and on behalf of L.E.E.
Chair Corporation. . .
We would appreciate your earliest reply, indicating any further requirements for finalizing this
cancellation."
It is apparent from the above quoted language that
the lestter was not to be understood as an immediate cancellation
or revocation.

If Midwest intended the letter to constitute

a cancellation, it would not have requested "further requirements for finalizing this cancellation."
As noted in the letter, the execution and delivery of
the letter was authorized by Midwest's Board of Directors.

A

member of that Board of Directors, present when the letter
commujiication was decided upon, reaffirmed that the intent of
the letter was to "cap" the guarantee rather than to cancel
the quarantee:

:,,• .

"Q. . . And I presume that you had some
discussion concerning this letter, before it
was sent, did you not?
A.

The Board of Directors did, yes.

Q. And when you say the Board of Directors
did, then that letter accurately sets forth
their intent and their discussion with regard to
that letter. Is that correct?
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-15A.

Certainly.

MR. CONDER: I object, your Honor.
letter speaks for itself.

The

THE COURT: I don't know without looking
at it. I will strike it if it does.
Q. Now, the intent of the Board as expressed
in that letter, was it not, was to reduce the
upper limit from $130,000.00 down to $85,000.00,
was it not?
A.

That's what it says.

Q. Certainly. And you personally agreed on
behalf of Midwest Realty to allow advances to keep
Lee Chair Corporation going so long as the upper
limit of that guarantee was capped or a ceiling
was put on it, did you not?
A.

I did not personally agree to it.

Q. Well, that was generally the intent and
discussion when the letter was sent, was it not?
A. I can't recall exactly the conversation
at the Board meeting, but that was the intent I
assume by this letter." (Testimony of John G.
Wells, Director of Midwest Realty, Tr. 12-13).
On July 8, 1971, the date that the letter of July 6,
1971 was received by the Bank, Mr. John G. Wells of Midwest
had a telephone conversation with a Mr. Walter J. Winrow of
the Bank (Tr. 13-14).

At this time it was the policy of the

Bank to make memoranda of all telephone conversations to avoid
problems occasioned by employee turn-over (Tr. 38). In
accordance with this policy of record keeping, Mr. Winrow made
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-16notes of the telephone conversation on the original of the
July letter (Tr. 38-39).

This memorandum of the conversation,

by reason of the passage of time, constitutes the most reliable
summary of the substance of the conversation.

The handwritten

memorandum summarizes the conversation as follows:
"Talked to J. Wells on 7-8-71 in detail about
my concern if guarantee reduced. I said I would
like to keep guarantee at $130,000.00 and indefinitely
'cap' the amount of receivables financing at current
bal of 31,212. He agreed. We also agreed on an
approx. 30 day deadline to define the intentions
of Midwest and Lee Chair. It's also understood
the 'cap1 fig. in the receivables line would be
reviewed if Lee Chair could convince Midwest and
we had new authorization. Magg has been informed
and agrees to these conditions WJW." (Exhibit 13)
The resolutions passed by the Board of Directors
of Midwest which authorized the execution delivery of both
guarantees provided:
"Be it further resolved, that the authority
hereby conferred is in addition to the authority
conferred by any other resolution heretofore or
hereafter delivered to Bank and will continue in
full force and effect until Bank shall have received official notice in writing from this
corporation of the revocation hereof by a resolution duly adopted by the Board of Directors of
this corporation and such revocation shall be
effective only as to loans made by Bank subsequent
to the receipt by it of such official notice."
(Exhibits 12 and 4)(Emphasis added.)
A review of the minutes of the meetings of the
Board of Directors of Midwest reveals that prior to July 6,
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-171971, it passed no resolution whatsoever which indicated or
even suggested that the guarantee should be revoked or
cancelled.
A review of the resolutions and minutes of the
meetings of the Board of Directors of Midwest show that a
meeting was held each year.

However, the minutes or resolutions

for the year 1971 are absent for some unexplained reason.

In

any event, the resolution and minutes which were produced by
Midwest establish that there was no resolution prior to July,
1971, revoking or cancelling the guarantee (Tr. 23-24, Exhibit
1).

The only resolution on the subject matter prior to July,

1971, was a resolution authorizing the officers to enter into
the guarantee arrangement (Exhibit 1).
After the telephone conversation between Wells and
Winrow on July 8, 1971, the Bank sent a letter to Midwest
setting forth the substance of that conversation.

The letter

stated:
"As to your letter of July 6, 1971, we have
discussed this with Mr. Winrow and he stated that
according to his conversation with Mr. Wells, the
intent of the letter was to 'cap1 the borrowing
which was done."(Exhibit 8)
Upon receipt of the letter by Midwest, there was
no response denying that characterization of the conversation,
denying the statement as to the intent of the letter, nor was
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-18there any act on the part of Midwest which indicated that the
letter was not an accurate statement of the conversation and
of the intent of the July, 1971 letter (Tr. 21).
The officers of Midwest were well aware that Lee
Chair was in a precarious financial position and needed
substcintial credit to maintain current operations (Tr. 10-11).
It was therefore apparent that a sudden termination of all
credit would have the immediate effect of forcing Lee Chair
to terminate business and thereby lose any hope that Lee Chair
could pay or reduce the debt from its current income.

The

trier of fact was entitled to infer that Midwest would not act
imprudently; that Midwest had nothing to lose by "capping" the
account since they were already liable for the indebtedness
incurred to date; and, that Midwest had everything to lose by
suddenly cutting off all credit and forcing Lee Chair out of
business without giving it the opportunity to pay or reduce the
debt.

A sudden cancellation of the guarantee and the resulting

sudden cancellation of credit to Lee Chair would have been an
imprudent and unreasonable act and thus the trier of fact was
justified in concluding that a cancellation of the guarantee
was not intended.
Both the December and November Guarantee provided
that they were cumulative with each other rather than superseding
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-19Nevertheless, the July letter mentioned only the December
Guarantee.

There was no mention of the November Guarantee.

This omission reveals the true intent of the letter.

The

failure to mention the November Guarantee is consistent with
an intent to "cap" the indebtedness at its then current level.
An intent to cap the guarantee did not require mention of
the November Guarantee inasmuch as the indebtedness was already
at the upper limit of that guarantee.

On the other hand, an

intent to cap the accounts, rather than to cancel them, would
require only mention of the December Guarantee since the
indebtedness under that guarantee had not yet reached the
maximum.

If the intent had been to cancel or terminate all

guarantees, Midwest would surely have mentioned the November
Guarantee inasmuch as it involved more indebtedness than did
the December Guarantee.

The trier of fact was entitled to

infer that Midwest would act consistently:

that it would not

have mentioned the November Guarantee if "capping" the account
were intended whereas mention of the November Guarantee was
necessary if cancellation of the guarantee was intended.
The above evidence is ample support for the finding
of the Court that the intent of the July, 1971 letter was to
"cap" the indebtedness guarantee and not to revoke the guarantee.
It was the exclusive province of the lower court, as the trier
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-20of fact, to resolve the dispute by finding that there was no
cancellation of the guarantee even though there was evidence
on the other side of the issue.. There is seldom a case where
there is not evidence on both sides of the factual disputes.
However, once the factual issues are decided, the decision
is final if there is evidence to support the finding.

The

above review of the evidence demonstrates that there is
evidence to support the lower court's finding.

Midwest's

review of contrary evidence is of no relevance to the issues
presented by this appeal and could only result in a re-trial
of the factual issues at the appellate level.
POINT II.
ALL OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE BASED UPON THE ASSUMPTION
THAT THE JULY LETTER CONSTITUTES A CANCELLATION OR SAID
ARGUMENTS ARE BASED UPON FACTUAL DISPUTES
The only real issue involved on this appeal is the
determination of the intent surrounding the execution and
delivery of the letter of July 6, 1971. Midwest admitted at
trial that this was the sole issue before the court and Midwest
waived all equitable defenses:
"MR. CONDER: Now, also in the interest of
time, your Honor, although the pleadings have
raised the question of consideration for the
guarantee, we will waive that. We are not going
to raise that.
The pleadings raised the question of estoppel.
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-21We are not going to raise that.
We have only got one issue here, and we
admit that the guarantees were secured. We
admit that the money was advanced by the Bank,
but we argue that the guarantee was cancelled
and that the Bank made advances after that
time and, therefore, that releases the guarantor.
It gets down to that simple issue.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. McDONALD: I assume also then, Mr.
Conder, you are waiving the defense of waiver
as well as estoppel and also the defense of
failure of demand?
MR. CONDER:
issue." (Tr. 16)

Yes. We have only the one

Inasmuch as the sole issue has been decided by the
trier of fact on the basis of the evidence at trial, all arguments assuming a contrary fact are irrelevant.

All arguments

which attempt a re-trial on the basis of disputed facts are
likewise irrelevant since such argument is outside the scope
of review.

See cases above cited.

Under Point II of its Brief, Midwest argues that the
December Guarantee superseded the November Guarantee.

The sole

purpose of this argument is to "combine" the guarantees so as
to make the July letter applicable to both guarantees rather than
just the December Guarantee which is the only one mentioned in
the letter.
The entire issue raised under Point II is irrelevant
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-22if the Court sustains the finding of the trial court that the
July letter "capped" the guarantee and did not constitute a
cancellation.

If the July letter merely capped the guarantee

and did not constitute a cancellation, it makes no difference
whether or not it applied to the November Guarantee because the
indebtedness under the November Guarantee was already at its
maximum limit at the time the July letter was received.
In a further attempt to "combine" the guarantees so
as to make the July letter applicable to both, Midwest argues
under Point II of its Brief, that the conduct of the parties
should be considered.

Midwest then notes a series of innocuous

acts which consist mainly of correspondence referring to the
guarantees in the singular rather than in the plural.
As previously noted, if the Court sustains the factual
findings of the trial court, it makes no difference whether or
not the guarantees are "combined" because if the July letter
"capped" the guarantees rather than cancel the guarantees, it
would have no effect on the November Guarantee which was already
at its maximum limit.

Furthermore, any inference with respect

to the conduct of the parties is a factual matter that has
already been disposed of in the trial court.

The trial court

specifically found that the December Guarantee did not supersede
the November Guarantee (R.111).

The cases, above quoted,
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-23exclude consideration of the factual disputes.

Finally,

the cases which permit the conduct of the parties to be considered in determining the meaning of a contract apply only to
situations where the meaning of the contract is ambiguous.

In

the instant case, the contractual provisions clearly and
unequivocally state that the December Guarantee is to be
cumulative and in addition to the obligation of the November
Guarantee.

See paragraph 2 of the guarantees, Exhibits 3

and 11. The unambiguous contractual terms preclude consideration of the conduct of the parties under the parol evidence
rule«

Parr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105 Utah 272, 143^P.2d

281(1943); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
Under Point III of its Brief, Midwest attempts a retrial of the case by reviewing all of the evidence favorable
to its position and then asks this Court to make a factual
finding on the basis of this evidence contrary to the factual
findings of the trial court.

Such an argument ignores the

scope of review in this matter.

Since the factual findings

of the trial court were supported by the evidence reviewed
under Point I of this Brief, this Court will not conduct a
re-trial of the facts on appeal.

Ray v. Consolidated Freight-

ways, 4 Utah 2d 137, 289 P.2d 196 (1955);

Wood v. Taylor, 8 Utah

2d 210, 332 P.2d 215 (1958); Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39
492 P.2d 1343 (1972); Garrett Freightlines v. Cornwall, 120
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-24Utah 175, 232 P.2d 786 (1951); Youngren v, John W. Lloyd Construction Company, 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969);
Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Company, 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d
622 (1956); Aagard v. Dayton & Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Company,
12 Utah 2d 34, 361 P.2d 522 (1961).

General Insurance Company v.

Lewis,121 Utah 440, 243 P.2d 433 (1952).
Under Point IV of its Brief, Midwest argues that
since the guarantees were revoked in July, 1971, any extension
or renwal of credit
of the guarantor.

after that date is not the responsibility
Such an argument assumes that the July

letter constituted a cancellation of the guarantee which is
contrary to the express findings of the trial court (R. 110-111).
Inasmuch as the trial court held that the July letter did not
constitute a cancellation, the question of liability for
extensions or renewals of credit after a cancellation is already
determined and is not subject to review.
Under Point IV of its Brief, Midwest argues that
the terms of the continuing guarantees authorized the Bank to
apply collateral in reduction of the debt. Midwest then goes
on to argue, without any reference to the evidence in the case,
that the Bank failed to apply the proceeds of the accounts
receivable to the indebtedness.

However, a cursory review of

the Bank's records (Exhibit 10) demonstrates that between the
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-25date the letter was received and the date of the commencement
of this suit the sum of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred
Ninety-Eight Dollars and 71/100 cents ($23,798.71) was applied
to the indebtedness from the collateral. Moreover, by the
terms of the guarantee, the Bank was not compelled to liquidate
the collateral but merely had the option to do so.

There is

no evidence whatsoever that the Bank did not use diligence in
collecting the accounts receivable and in applying the same
to the indebtedness.
Under Point V of its Brief, Midwest agains asserts
an argument based upon the assumption that the July letter
constituted a cancellation of the guarantee.

The argument,

and the cases cited, all involve a cancellation which is absent
in the instant case.
Under Point VI of its Brief, defendant again asserts
an argument based upon the assumption that the July letter
constituted a cancellation.
POINT III.
IF THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE REVERSED,
MIDWEST IS STILL LIABLE UNDER ITS GUARANTEES.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that this Court
were to review the factual findings of the trial court and
reverse the same, Midwest would still be liable under its
guarantees.
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-26First, even if the July letter were regarded as a
cancellation, under no stretch of the imagination could it
cancel the November Guarantee.

The letter referred specifically

to the December Guarantee and made no reference whatsoever to
the November Guarantee.

These were separate and distinct

guarantees, and the December Guarantee did not supersede the
November Guarantee.
The December Guarantee specifically provided in
paragraph 2 that it was "in addition to any obligations of
guarantors. . .under any other guarantees of indebtedness of
borrowers. . .heretofore given. . .to Bank."

This language

is clear and unambiguous and is not subject to any contrary
construction.

>'

Paragraph 2 of the November Guarantee provided

that it was "in addition to any obligations of guarantors. . .
under any other guarantees of indebtedness of borrowers. . .hereafter to be given to Bank."

Thus, both guarantees clearly

state their relationship with the other and no strained construction can insert any ambiguity into the clear and unequivocal meaning of the language.

Thus, if the July letter were a

cancellation, it can only cancel the guarantee which it purported
to cancel.

The letter specifically mentioned the December

Guarantee and made no mention whatsoever of the November Guarante
Midwest cited several cases supporting the proposition
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-27that the conduct of the parties may be considered in determining
the meaning of ambiguous contract provisions.

Inasmuch as

there is no ambiguity in the provisions relating to the relation
ship between the two guarantees# the conduct of the parties
is irrelevant.

Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105 Utah 272, 143

P.2d 281 (1943); Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
Even if the contractual provisions were ambiguous,
the conduct cited by Midwest is far from sufficient to give
the Court any insight as to the meaning of the terms. The
unilateral undisclosed intent of G. R. Harmon, President of
Midwest, could have no bearing on the meaning of the contract
which is diametrically opposed to his unilateral understanding.
The fact that correspondence between the parties referred to
"guarantee" in the singular is insufficient to change the terms
of the contract.

In each instance, the parties were not pur-

porting to state their intent as to the cumulative effect of
the guarantees.

Moreover, the reference to "guarantee" in the

singular is not grammatically incorrect.

The fact that there

are two documents does not require reference to guarantees in
the plural. A debtor who executes two notes to a Bank does not
thereafter require the Bank in their correspondence to refer
to his "debts" in the plural.

It is grammatically correct to

refer to his obligation as a "debt" in the singular despite
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-28the fact that the single debt is evidenced by two separate
promissory notes.
If Midwest's argument were accepted, it would have
a catastrophic effect in commerce.

The terms of an agreement

could be altered or amended by a secretary, clerk, or officer
of the corporation by an inadvertent reference which was not
consistent with the legal effect of a contract.

Such a

ruling would require every correspondence which made any
reference to the legal rights of the author to be reviewed
by attorneys.
The fact that account cards kept by the Bank
designated only the December Guarantee during the period from
February 1971 to July 1971, and thereafter showed no guarantee
at all, is of no significance to the issues before the Court.
The account cards were maintained to record payments and
advances and did not purport to be an official statement of the
Bank's legal rights with respect to the debtor (Tr. 45). If
Midwest*s argument were accepted, filing clerks and bookkeepers
would require constant legal advice to assure that the internal
records of the Bank contained no notation inconsistent with the
legal rights of the Bank.
Midwest cites 100 A.L.R. 1236 and other texts in
support of the proposition that renewals or extensions of
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-29pre-existing indebtedness after cancellation of a guarantee
are not binding on the guarantor,

A review of this annotation

reveals that there is a split of authority on that particular
question.

Some courts hold the guarantor liable for renewals

and extensions of credit after cancellation so long as there
is no new money advanced nor any increase in the indebtedness.
Of significance to this case, the State of California subscribes
to this latter view:

renewals of existing indebtedness after

cancellation which do not involve the advance of new money are
still the responsibility of the guarantor if the indebtedness
renewed was existing prior to cancellation of the guarantee, cf.
Rodabaugh v. Kauffman, 200 P. 747 (Cal. 1921); First National
Bank of Redondo v. Spalding, 170 P. 407 (Cal. 1918); American
Trust Company v. Jones, 20 P.2d 346 (Cal. 1933).

The law of

California governs this case inasmuch as the Bank is a California
banking institution engaged in the practice of banking in the
State of California; the debt which was guaranteed by Midwest
was negotiated and incurred in the State of California; Lee
Chair Corporation is a California corporation that operates
in the State of California; the obligation to guarantee indebtedness was incurred each time there was an advance to Lee
Chair (R. 141) and thus the obligation of guarantee was made in
the State of California (Tr. 54).
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With respect to the accounts receivable financing,
if the July 8, 1971 letter is construed as a cancellation,
Midwest was not prejudice by the later extensions of credit
inasmuch as said extensions enabled Lee Chair to remain in
busines.s and reduce the indebtedness on the accounts receivable
financing by an amount equal to Twenty-Three Thousand Seven
Hundred Ninety-Eight Dollars and 71/100 cents ($23,798.71)
(Exhibit 10).
If the July 6, 1971 letter is construed as a cancellation, and it were held that Midwest is not liable for later
advances of credit, then it follows that Midwest would not be
entitled to benefit from any payments made on the debt from
accounts receivable created after the date of the cancellation.
In this regard, Midwest totally failed in its burden of proof
as to the extent of its liability.

It offered no evidence with

respect to the identity of the accounts receivable which were
credited as payments to the indebtedness after July 6, 1971. The
question of payments is a matter of defense, and the burden of
proof rests upon Midwest.

Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedui

Having claimed a cancellation of liability, Midwest had the burdei
of proving which payments were attributable to its liability
and it was entitled to the benefit only from payments attributabl
to accounts receivable credited prior to its cancellation.
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-31Having failed in that burden, the Court was entitled to assume
that all payments made on the accounts receivable financing
discharged advances made subsequent to July 6, 1971. Accordingly, even if the guarantee were cancelled, the remaining
indebtedness was attributable to advances prior to cancellation.
^2

CONCLUSION

v vN

The sole issue before the trial court was the legal
effect of the letter of July 6, 1971. The respective parties
produced evidence with respect to that intent, including the
letter itself, and all of said evidence was available to the
trial court in determining the issue.

The trial court, sitting

as the trier of fact, determined that the intent of the letter
was to cap the accounts receivable at the level of indebtedness
existing on the date the letter was received, July 8, 1971.
There was sufficient evidence to justify this finding.

Inas-

much as the amount of indebtedness existing on July 8, 1971
was never exceeded, the trier of fact properly determined
that Midwest was liable for later renewals or extensions of
credit.

This factual determination is not subject to re-trial

on appeal and the judgment based upon said factual determination
should be affirmed.
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-32Respectfully submitted,
JONES,) WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully moves the Court
for its Order awarding attorneys fees on appeal in this
matter for legal services incurred in connection with the
appeal, the amount of said fees to be determined upon remand
on the basis of evidence to be presented to the lower court.
All attorneys fees granted to date in the lower court are
attributable solely to legal services prior to the appeal in
this matter.

This Motion is made pursuant to the provisions

of paragraph 9 of the November Guarantee and the December
Guarantee which paragraphs provide:
"Guarantors agree to pay a reasonable attorneys'
fee and all other costs and expenses which may be
incurred by Bank in the enforcement of this guarantee
and in the collection of indebtedness of borrowers
to Bank."
The above quoted provisions entitle plaintiff-respondent to
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-33compensation for said attorneys fees and the failure to award
the same would result in a reduction of the recovery of funds
loaned in reliance upon said guarantees.
Dated this the J?2Tday df JuJ4C# 1975.
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